Riots in Iran: Have things changed in 10 years?

The riots were the worst in Iran since the revolution of 1979. Thousands of students took to the streets, pelting stones at security forces and setting fire to pictures of the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The disturbances left a trail of burned-out vehicles and smashed shop fronts. (BBC News)

The above could be a description of events taking place recently during the Ashura or during one of many protests doting the Iranian calendar since the rigged-elections of June 12. But the above recounts what took place 10 years ago, in July 1999.

Back then, reformist President Mohammad Khatami had been voted in office two years previously in a land slide election. Yet he was a member of the political community and sided quickly with the hardliners within the regime when the violence broke out. This explains in large measure why the manifestations only lasted 6 days. Khatami, who favored gradual, peaceful reform to the violent uprising, was never able to make much headway with his program despite being re-elected in 2001. The Supreme Leader and the twelve-member Guardian Council, two bodies with greater power within the Iranian political system than the President, believed that Khatami could become the Gorbatchev of the regime fearing that his reforms would gather an unstoppable momentum which would lead to a counter-revolution, and so they clamped down. (Mr. Khatami is now one of several figures in the current opposition movement.)

During Khatami's second term and after him, there was the American-Iraq war and the ongoing nuclear crisis. Both were foreign threats and acted as unifiers upon Iranian society putting to the fore its most hawkish and conservative forces.

But today, after accusations of vote-rigging during the Presidential re-election of President Ahmadinejad, we have entered the second round of political dissent within the country and the consequences have the potential to go much deeper. In fact, in some ways, we already have if we are to believe the words of Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, head of the increasingly powerful Revolutionary Guard or IRGC. He spoke this summer after his command effectively wrested control over the internal situation:

“We are convinced that the IRGC must play a deciding role in the preservation and continuation of the revolution.”(...)“These events put us in a new stage of the revolution and political struggles, and all of us must fully comprehend its dimensions,” (Press.tv, an Iranian Government media)

Indeed, while the 1999 protests were short lived, we have now witnessed 7 consecutive months of unrest. This unrest has manifested itself not only in visible street protests, but through civil disobedience such as anti-government chants during football matches, a "currency campaign" whereby thousands of rial notes have been marked with anti-government graffiti, and, none the least, it is being expressed through the internet which the authorities have failed to control effectively.

The message in 1999 wasn't clear; students reacted spontaneously to a series of events. They wanted more openness within civil society and less control from the government in their lives, they just weren't sure how much and how to do it. They had no leader but by and large, they wanted reform which, as we saw, the government failed to deliver.

Today, the message still isn't very clear yet. It has evolved from contesting the election results to toppling the regime. It is certainly not established - like some westerners wish to believe, that the population as a whole would vote to establish a liberal democracy if they were subjected to a referendum. After all, their rallying cry during the protests is often "Allahu Akhbar" (God is great). What is significant however is that in the footage of the demonstrations are represented a wide spectrum of the population, in particular women, some older men, and working class men, the latter traditionally the base of the Ahmadinejad government. It isn't just students.

While none can speak for all, the leaders of the opposition are more present than they were in 1999. Ten years ago, the clerics pulled together and the protesters were left to hang dry. Today, there is a mixture of pragmatists, reformists, and moderate conservatives openly voicing their concerns on the handling of the situation by the authorities in support of the popular protests. Some leaders such as Mousavi have also joined the crowds on occasion.

Overall, the opposition counts two presidential candidates, two former presidents, and a group of clerics. Some of these figures are currently testing how much they can get away with and haven't yet been arrested only because the hardliners within the regime do not want to make martyrs out of them. Instead, the Iranian Police have been targeting members of their entourage. The regime seems to be making strenuous efforts to balance its reaction and avoid giving the opposition greater cause for action. At the same time, the Mousavi's, Kerroubi's, Rafsanjani's, and Kathani's probably do not wish to cast their lot with a populist movement that may or may not succeed and with whom they may or may not fully agree.

“The longer this goes on, the more difficult will it be for the likes of Moussavi and Karroubi to sustain their current position,” said Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who has worked for the State Department. “They have to at some point opt for regime survival or become the leaders of an opposition movement calling for more than reform.”(NY Times)

It is as of yet unclear what direction they will take. All of the opposition figures were and are still part of the political elite of the country having served, or continuing to serve in some cases, at the highest level of government (Rafsanjani is the chairman of the Assembly of Experts who has the constitutional power of removing the Supreme Leader). In any case, there is now a great factional divide tearing up through every level of Iranian society.

UPDATE: Mousavi has since stated he was ready to become a martyr for the cause.

On the other side of the divide is what Robin Wright has called the "New Right" in a recent report to the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs.

The New Right centers around a second generation of revolutionaries who call themselves “principlists.” Many came of age during the revolution’s first traumatic decade. They provided the backbone of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij(or “mobilization resistance force”) that secured the revolution during the chaotic early years. They were hardened during the 1980-88 Iraq war, the bloodiest modern Middle East conflict. In the 1990s, they went to university and entered the work force. After Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, many gained positions of political or economic power. (Iran's Green Movement)

It is important to stress that the clerics are now deeply divided about the course to take which was not the case in 1999. Kerroubi, Rafsanjani and Khatani are all clerics. Qom, the traditional center of intellectual thought for Shia Islam in Iran, is split over the issue and have called into question the neutrality of the Guardian Council as early as July. Although we can only speculate, it is easy to imagine dissension amongst the Guardian Council and hesitation about what to do following the events in June which would have opened the door for more affirmative action by the Revolutionary Guard.

The New Right has effectively wrested control of the regime and the security instruments needed to hold on to power. In stark contrast to the revolution’s first generation, most are laymen, not clerics. They have effectively pushed many of the original revolutionaries, including big-name clerics, to the sidelines—at least for now. (Iran's Green Movement)

The beneficiary and the instrument of this political change within the Iranian regime is without question the Revolutionary Guard. Over the years, they have increased their presence throughout society. It's alumni occupy cabinet positions, they are are members of parliament, and head large corporations. Ahmadinejad is a former member himself and has further increased the institution's economic role which now translates into a "multibillion-dollar business empire" (NY Times). The Revolutionary Guards is a corps of around 120,000 people, is seen by many as the vehicle of upward social mobility, and is believed to be in control of developing the Iranian nuclear program.

A recent RAND Corporation study on the Revolutionary Guard had this to say about the vision and the purpose that its members have for themselves:

Within the factional debates that characterize Iran’s political landscape, the IRGC leadership appears to believe that its legitimacy is dependent on reviving and burnishing its role in the foundational myths of the Islamic Republic of Iran—the suppression of internal enemies during the revolution’s early days, a role in the “sacred defense” during the Iran-Iraq War, and the postwar economic reconstruction. (RAND)

The comments by Jafari, the head of the Revolutionary Guard noted above express as much.

However, the extent to which it can flaunt the other political institutions is uncertain as the constitution of Iran is ultimately circumscribed by a system of checks and balances. One thing is certain: if a full fledged counter-revolution is to go the distance (i.e. reversing the Islamic revolution), the cycle of violence is only going to become much worse and the Revolutionary Guard and their Basij vigilantes will be called to play a growing role. The Revolutionary Guard is “the only institution in Iran capable of both enforcing and breaching any red lines.”(comments reported in RAND)

And there is ample room for things to get much uglier. Despite eight deaths during the violence, it is worth noting that most police forces and the Basij militia refrained from using lethal force during the Ashura protests, sometimes at their own personal demise. The police and the Basij were mostly armed with batons and tear gas, and youtube videos have shown them often being overwhelmed, cornered and beaten themselves (see "Uskowi on Iran" for an image and video analysis of the Ashura clashes).

Wednesday, amidst pro-government rallies numbering in the hundreds of thousands, there were signs that the regime is ready to escalate its response. In what seems to have been a conscious effort by the regime to send a stronger message, the leader of the legislative, the speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, said that the protesters violated civil rights, and called for the “arrest of offenders of the religion and the harshest punishment for antirevolutionary figures.” (NY Times) Others said that the protesters were now considered "enemy of God".

On a note of optimism, one possible scenario for a quieter revolution comes from the fact that even within the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard, the factional divide between realists and ideologues is present. It is reported that in 1997, around 77% voted for Khatami. But this was a different time and about a popular vote. The opacity of the "New Right" is such that it is difficult to tell if there are any cracks within their resolve.