Why Climate Change Needs its Own International Institution

The science of climate change can be controversial: it is hazy at best, corrupt at worst. Short of seeing too much into “climate gate” however and putting the blame on scientists for their zeal and conflict of interests, the biggest problem with the science is that its subject matter is incredibly complex. What will happen and how will it affect us and the planet remotely into the future are very difficult questions to answer.

What is certain however, is that we can’t afford to not do anything about it.

Consequently, there are two useful metaphor in dealing with climate change I have come across.

The first is that we must see the need to do something about it as an insurance we buy today against the possibility of disastrous scenarios in the future. You put a small down payment today against the small but would-be catastrophic risk that something will happen. This addresses the need of the international community to be willing to sacrifice a small portion of global GDP (perhaps 1%) to safeguard against serious trouble 100 years down the road. The purpose here is to slow down or possibly reverse that adverse impact we are having on our environment.

Complementary to the first, the second metaphor is that we must find contingency plans, and develop accompanying technologies and systems to go with it, that we can spring into action if needed much like you would equip a house or a building with fire protection measures such as ladders and sprinklers in case a fire happens. Those fire protection measures may never be used - but they are there in case an unforeseeable but catastrophic event occurs.

I will discuss measures spawning from the first metaphor above as it pertains best to my belief that some form of international institutionalization will be necessary to successfully tackle the problem of climate change. I will leave the second metaphor perhaps for another time.

It is worth noting that from the start we have pursued the first metaphor with first Rio de Janeiro, then Kyoto,  and now Copenhagen. All three were failures: Rio was inconclusive, Kyoto saw last minute measures that eventually were never upheld, and Copenhagen was salvaged but with targets so small and far into the future such that no one would be compromised again.

There are two sources of problems that haven’t been met yet that explain those shortcomings: a lack of representation of the relevant interests and, secondly, a lack of institutionalization to streamline an effective international-wide policy.

First the problem with who’s interest it is that are being represented or not represented.

A very smart man said that we are having problems coping with climate change because it epitomizes the kind of problems humans are bad at: we are pretty good at solving problems that will have an immediate impact, but bad at the ones that require us to sacrifice now to gain a greater reward or avoiding a greater cost in the future. But a look at the success of insurance companies and the dissemination of their products through all walks of life, for all kinds of situation small and large shows us otherwise. Likewise, engineers often try to foolproof their systems with measures that directly factor into the cost of their designs; and military planners account for a wide array of strategic scenarios that requires expanding costs now just in case they happen in the future. We are thus pretty good at valuing risk and putting a price tag on it.

The problem lies with who’s interest the shot-callers on climate change policy serve: the state. Despite what the heralds of globalization were saying 10 years ago, the state is and will remain the main actor and decider on the international stage for the foreseeable future. The state is personified as having interests on the world stage and its leaders pursue those interests as they engage in competition with other states. Consequently, no state wishes to adopt measures that will undermine their economic interest if they cannot ensure that other states will do the same without cheating. That is very difficult to do.

Take the model of domestic politics. Here, the state’s interest - often called national interest, sometimes clashes with the individual’s interest. The liberal left and the conservative right can best be seen as who’s interest they advocate most: the individual for the liberals and the state for the conservative. Both sometimes are in conflict with one another as anyone who even remotely follows the politics of his country can attest.

But of course, not all problems are zero sum games. In fact, what is good for the state is in most cases good for the individual, and vice versa. Likewise, what is good for the international community is often good for the states that compose it. Indeed, if the worst climate change scenario proves true, there might be no states to talk of in a post apocalyptic world.

The problem thus becomes one of common good. Common goods, throughout history, have always been served by governments, or by rich nobles performing the function. In any case, public goods always go beyond the individual’s interest. Thus, the lack of representation of the states’ collective is tied to the lack of institution that will carry out the public good function on climate change.

What we are lacking, decidedly, is real power vested in a body representing the international community’s interest, i.e. the states’ collective interest, to tackle problems of climate change in order to balance the power of the states and enforce upon them their resolutions.

This undoubtedly raises questions of sovereignty which, in our current effective state model, can be thorny, but which are not insurmountable. There are precedents: The WTO and the European Union, while both messy and uneven experiences, are successful, enduring institutions in their own right.

On the other hand, the recent Copenhagen summit was chaotic, unprofessional, and inflamed by fanatic protesters. While much of the legwork should have been done before the conference, the leaders arrived at the end left to hang dry by the negotiators. The leaders essentially signed a face-saving agreement that amounted to nothing. The president of the conference and the organization put too much on the table coming from too many people, and there was too little head-to-head time between the main actors to accomplish anything meaningful.

What we need to start with is to create an international body, probably modeled on the WTO, with permanent staffers both at the international level and within each countries to carry out negotiations, tackle issues one at a time in a deliberative manner, do one-on-ones between specific states, or blocs of states, and slowly develop a permanent institution that will have its own processes and functions with an arbitration arm that can issue legally binding obligations between countries.

While the problem is pressing, you can’t accomplish that in two weeks - no matter how many costumes and props you bring to the party.