Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Baathist Witch Hunt Dangerous for the Future of Iraq

Basra Sunni Protest

Much of the future of Iraq hinges on the upcoming legislative elections to be held in early March. The elections were originally scheduled for January but have been postponed because the Sunni, Shia and Kurdish power brokers could not agree on who could run for election. More than 511 candidates have been disqualified from running in a Shia dominated government (which is coincidentally reminiscent of the frequent massive disqualifications of presidential candidates in the other Shia country next door).

The reasons given or otherwise are that the banned candidates were too high up in Saddam’s former Baathist regime, or that they had links with insurgents in the past years when ethnic violence was at its highest.

This amounts to a witch hunt. A political witch hunt is when a group of people is systematically targeted by a majority through a combination of discrimination, imprisonment/interrogation, barring from positions of power, or defamation of character and public humiliation, for illegitimate reasons based on identity or ideology.

I believe that the security and ability to survive for a regime depends on its ability to generate an image of justice and legitimacy in the minds of the its relevant constituents.

Justice and Legitimacy are cognitive categories and while they are influenced by material conditions – the distribution of wealth, the efficiency of courts, the application of repressive and security instruments, the lawful transfers of power - they are abstract entities. The calculus of material factors determining whether or not such and such an arrangement is legitimate or just can sometimes leave a gap with the effective sentiments of justice and legitimacy within a population.

Indeed the nature of a state of justice or injustice and of legitimacy or illegitimacy within someone’s mind is often best studied by the poetic traditions studying the drama of personal relations rather than the scientific traditions looking at empirical material and economic statistics. The government of Iraq may have all intents of splitting the spoils of oil fairly between the different factions, but the perception of injustice in the interaction between the political actors could matter more in the end.

It all depends on "what’s the story" – what narrative or spin the constituents are putting on the material events. Ultimately, those perceptions can make the difference whether or not a group of people decides to take up arms against its government.

In this case, the widespread barring of former Baathists, who are of course all Sunnis, by the Shia dominated government on specious grounds will be perceived as an injustice against their group and will delegitimize the government after the elections. It will further create injustices by the resulting material lack of representation for Sunni interests within the government over the next electoral cycle.

Of course justice and legitimacy can be different looking at the same events depending on your constituency – and indeed, when two constituencies are opponents, they are always different. The Shias’ narrative is that former Baathists element were at the core of the horrendous sectarian violence that tore apart their country a few years ago. Baathists were the people who repressed them under Saddam too, and, by psychologically transposing their past suffering to the Sunni community as a whole, for centuries indeed.

The Shias are also suspicious of the Baathists credentials as great democrats. But this is all a mistake on the Shias' part and the burden of changing attitudes lies on their side.

Saddam is no more and the current political community of the Sunnis - which has for leaders former Baathists by the force of things, is different from the regime of yore. A political community is not a regime (understood here as the structure of government), no more than a regime is the authorities of the regime. Those are three different elements defining the nature of political systems and we cannot confound them. There is no reason why the former Baathists will not play by the new regime’s rules.

A lot is hanging in the balance. The cessation of out of control sectarian violence a couple of years ago was only permitted by a parallel robust political effort to integrate the country at the national level. The unraveling of the national political process could rekindle the devastating fires of the religious schism. Sunni participation in the political process is critical.

The burden of changing attitudes and to compromise is also on the Shias because they are the strongest faction. They are less likely to get up from the metaphorical negotiating table than their Sunni counterparts for whom this could very well be make or break.

Link: Political Turmoil Follows Barring of Hundreds from Iraq Ballot - NY Times

Photo Credit: AP through NY Times.

Friday, January 8, 2010

Afghanistan: The Difference with Iraq



We are hearing that there are still disagreements about the implementation and interpretation of the Obama plan for Afghanistan. The differences seem to pit the Pentagon against the civilian executive. The American generals wish for a more expensive, fuller counter insurgency strategy while the civilians insist on a narrower engagement. The Obama administration is eager to find a way out and is ready to tolerate a certain level of violence within Afghanistan as long as true counter-terrorist action is carried out effectively. The Pentagon, on the other hand, is reluctant to give up a strategy that seems to have worked so well for them in Iraq. 

There lies the problem. I believe that the ongoing resolution of the conflict in Iraq has much less to do with American military involvement through a Surge of troops and a re-writing - however praise-worthy it was, of the Counter-Insurgency manual by General Petraeus, than it had to do with changing conditions in the indigenous conflict between the Sunnis and the Shias.

In Iraq, an active civil war was going on. The Sunnis had lost their traditional position of dominance in the country and were fighting for their future against a vindicative and revived Shia majority. Partly because of Saddam's past policies of integrating the country by settling Sunnis in traditional Shia or Kurdish territory, there was now a central area in Iraq that became the hotbed of inter-sectarian violence centered in and around the capital Baghdad. On top of the century old sectarian rivalry, Iraq had rich oil reserves that acted as a strong centralizing force.

The turning point came late in 2006 - before the Surge was even announced, when the Sunnis collectively figured they could not win. They were in desperate need for an ally and that ally came in the form of the US occupier. At the same time, the US forces changed their approach and instead of fighting them like they did in 2004 and 2005 in Fallujah or Ramadi, engaged the Sunni population at the village and tribal level creating more human contacts and offering local leaders money and development support in exchange for their help in turning the irreconcilables within their midst. Not only that, but the Americans also offered political protection against their Shia adversaries vis-à-vis the creation and composition of the national government. The US successfully came in between both parties and the political process of forming a government and the reconstitution of the country could move forward. The Surge itself provided the additional security needed to cement the tacit truce, particularly in Bagdad which was the focal point of the sectarian violence, but it could not and was not the primary factor in the consumption of the inter-sectarian conflict.

The Shias were also exhausted on their side and so the parallel political process at the national level could move forward. The opportunity was seized, the security gains cemented but only because an equilibrium had been reached in the intestine conflict. In many ways, the "violent dialogue" of the inter-sectarian conflict was a necessary step.

Since then, the violence has dropped both in between Shias and Sunnis and against American forces although there continues to be few but spectacular attacks every other month perpetrated by the Sunni irreconcilables. December was the first month in the war without a single American casualty, and the inter-ethnic violence continues to go down on a year by year basis in a conflict that has made over 100,000 Iraqi casualties by most estimates - only a fraction of which came from direct American action. The next step for Iraq is the parliamentary election now slated for March. How successful they are will dictate whether the country continues down the path of peace or if tensions reappear between the factions.

The situation in Afghanistan is largely different and this is why the American cannot hope to successfully fight a counter-insurgency without going beyond their national tolerance, surtaxing their treasury and perpetuating a legacy that is weakening their international standing. They should not do it on the principle of balancing responsibilities and national interests. And they cannot expect the same success from a new Surge because they fail to see the fundamental differences between the two conflicts, and overestimate their role in the improvement of the situation in Iraq.

In Afghanistan the war is not between two indigenous factions, but between the anti-afghan forces and the US government. The Taliban and other groups loosely associated with them are fighting the Americans first hoping that one day they will get at the central government and its northern allies. The civil war between the old afghan adversaries is frozen and the "violent dialogue" will not resume until the Americans rescind their front role. The Karzai government is not only shielded by the presence of the US government (see "Afghanis fighting for Afghanistan") but also by its geography. In Iraq, both warring factions were intermingled in the infamous sunni triangle. Not so in Afghanistan where the Pashtuns are located primarily in the South and East and have sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan effectively forming a Taliban mini state. There is no violence in Kabul like there was in Baghdad. There is neither a centrifugal pull exerted in Afghanistan by the equivalent of Iraqi oil. The conflict is currently more religious, more about freedom and less pragmatic. The Sunni tribal leaders and power brokers were interested in keeping a stake in their country and eventually joined the central government. The anti-afghan forces are true mujahedeens and currently see no reason to engage the central government. Neither are the Karzai governement and its northern allies ready to extend a hand to their foes since they have little incentive to do so.

Of course, there are different paths for conflicts to resolve themselves and certainly not all should look like Iraq. But basing a strategy on "what worked in Iraq" and applying it to fundamentally different conditions on the ground makes for a very dubious outcome. At the core is a discrepancy between national interests - that of the Americans and that of the Afghan government, and their security responsibilities. There needs to be an intellectual separation made between the afghan conflict which is the affair of the afghan factions to resolve, and the counter-terrorism and support role - not front role, in the afghan conflict which is the affair of the Americans.


My next piece will be about the prospects of the Afghan National Forces and the historical mistake of the Americans to play a front role in the Afghan conflict after Tora Bora and the disarmament of the Northern Alliance.

Photo credit: CFR.org