Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Thursday, December 31, 2009

Riots in Iran: Have things changed in 10 years?


The riots were the worst in Iran since the revolution of 1979. Thousands of students took to the streets, pelting stones at security forces and setting fire to pictures of the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The disturbances left a trail of burned-out vehicles and smashed shop fronts. (BBC News)
The above could be a description of events taking place recently during the Ashura or during one of many protests doting the Iranian calendar since the rigged-elections of June 12. But the above recounts what took place 10 years ago, in July 1999.

Back then, reformist President Mohammad Khatami had been voted in office two years previously in a land slide election. Yet he was a member of the political community and sided quickly with the hardliners within the regime when the violence broke out. This explains in large measure why the manifestations only lasted 6 days. Khatami, who favored gradual, peaceful reform to the violent uprising, was never able to make much headway with his program despite being re-elected in 2001. The Supreme Leader and the twelve-member Guardian Council, two bodies with greater power within the Iranian political system than the President, believed that Khatami could become the Gorbatchev of the regime fearing that his reforms would gather an unstoppable momentum which would lead to a counter-revolution, and so they clamped down. (Mr. Khatami is now one of several figures in the current opposition movement.)

During Khatami's second term and after him, there was the American-Iraq war and the ongoing nuclear crisis. Both were foreign threats and acted as unifiers upon Iranian society putting to the fore its most hawkish and conservative forces.

But today, after accusations of vote-rigging during the Presidential re-election of President Ahmadinejad, we have entered the second round of political dissent within the country and the consequences have the potential to go much deeper. In fact, in some ways, we already have if we are to believe the words of Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, head of the increasingly powerful Revolutionary Guard or IRGC. He spoke this summer after his command effectively wrested control over the internal situation:
“We are convinced that the IRGC must play a deciding role in the preservation and continuation of the revolution.”(...)“These events put us in a new stage of the revolution and political struggles, and all of us must fully comprehend its dimensions,” (Press.tv, an Iranian Government media)
Indeed, while the 1999 protests were short lived, we have now witnessed 7 consecutive months of unrest. This unrest has manifested itself not only in visible street protests, but through civil disobedience such as anti-government chants during football matches, a "currency campaign" whereby thousands of rial notes have been marked with anti-government graffiti, and, none the least, it is being expressed through the internet which the authorities have failed to control effectively.

The message in 1999 wasn't clear; students reacted spontaneously to a series of events. They wanted more openness within civil society and less control from the government in their lives, they just weren't sure how much and how to do it. They had no leader but by and large, they wanted reform which, as we saw, the government failed to deliver.

Today, the message still isn't very clear yet. It has evolved from contesting the election results to toppling the regime. It is certainly not established - like some westerners wish to believe, that the population as a whole would vote to establish a liberal democracy if they were subjected to a referendum. After all, their rallying cry during the protests is often "Allahu Akhbar" (God is great). What is significant however is that in the footage of the demonstrations are represented a wide spectrum of the population, in particular women, some older men, and working class men, the latter traditionally the base of the Ahmadinejad government. It isn't just students.

While none can speak for all, the leaders of the opposition are more present than they were in 1999. Ten years ago, the clerics pulled together and the protesters were left to hang dry. Today, there is a mixture of pragmatists, reformists, and moderate conservatives openly voicing their concerns on the handling of the situation by the authorities in support of the popular protests. Some leaders such as Mousavi have also joined the crowds on occasion.

Overall, the opposition counts two presidential candidates, two former presidents, and a group of clerics. Some of these figures are currently testing how much they can get away with and haven't yet been arrested only because the hardliners within the regime do not want to make martyrs out of them. Instead, the Iranian Police have been targeting members of their entourage. The regime seems to be making strenuous efforts to balance its reaction and avoid giving the opposition greater cause for action. At the same time, the Mousavi's, Kerroubi's, Rafsanjani's, and Kathani's probably do not wish to cast their lot with a populist movement that may or may not succeed and with whom they may or may not fully agree.
“The longer this goes on, the more difficult will it be for the likes of Moussavi and Karroubi to sustain their current position,” said Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who has worked for the State Department. “They have to at some point opt for regime survival or become the leaders of an opposition movement calling for more than reform.”(NY Times)
It is as of yet unclear what direction they will take. All of the opposition figures were and are still part of the political elite of the country having served, or continuing to serve in some cases, at the highest level of government (Rafsanjani is the chairman of the Assembly of Experts who has the constitutional power of removing the Supreme Leader). In any case, there is now a great factional divide tearing up through every level of Iranian society.

UPDATE: Mousavi has since stated he was ready to become a martyr for the cause.

On the other side of the divide is what Robin Wright has called the "New Right" in a recent report to the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs.
The New Right centers around a second generation of revolutionaries who call themselves “principlists.” Many came of age during the revolution’s first traumatic decade. They provided the backbone of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij(or “mobilization resistance force”) that secured the revolution during the chaotic early years. They were hardened during the 1980-88 Iraq war, the bloodiest modern Middle East conflict. In the 1990s, they went to university and entered the work force. After Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, many gained positions of political or economic power. (Iran's Green Movement)
It is important to stress that the clerics are now deeply divided about the course to take which was not the case in 1999. Kerroubi, Rafsanjani and Khatani are all clerics. Qom, the traditional center of intellectual thought for Shia Islam in Iran, is split over the issue and have called into question the neutrality of the Guardian Council as early as July. Although we can only speculate, it is easy to imagine dissension amongst the Guardian Council and hesitation about what to do following the events in June which would have opened the door for more affirmative action by the Revolutionary Guard.
The New Right has effectively wrested control of the regime and the security instruments needed to hold on to power. In stark contrast to the revolution’s first generation, most are laymen, not clerics. They have effectively pushed many of the original revolutionaries, including big-name clerics, to the sidelines—at least for now. (Iran's Green Movement)
The beneficiary and the instrument of this political change within the Iranian regime is without question the Revolutionary Guard. Over the years, they have increased their presence throughout society. It's alumni occupy cabinet positions, they are are members of parliament, and head large corporations. Ahmadinejad is a former member himself and has further increased the institution's economic role which now translates into a "multibillion-dollar business empire" (NY Times). The Revolutionary Guards is a corps of around 120,000 people, is seen by many as the vehicle of upward social mobility, and is believed to be in control of developing the Iranian nuclear program.

A recent RAND Corporation study on the Revolutionary Guard had this to say about the vision and the purpose that its members have for themselves:
Within the factional debates that characterize Iran’s political landscape, the IRGC leadership appears to believe that its legitimacy is dependent on reviving and burnishing its role in the foundational myths of the Islamic Republic of Iran—the suppression of internal enemies during the revolution’s early days, a role in the “sacred defense” during the Iran-Iraq War, and the postwar economic reconstruction. (RAND)
The comments by Jafari, the head of the Revolutionary Guard noted above express as much.

However, the extent to which it can flaunt the other political institutions is uncertain as the constitution of Iran is ultimately circumscribed by a system of checks and balances. One thing is certain: if a full fledged counter-revolution is to go the distance (i.e. reversing the Islamic revolution), the cycle of violence is only going to become much worse and the Revolutionary Guard and their Basij vigilantes will be called to play a growing role. The Revolutionary Guard is “the only institution in Iran capable of both enforcing and breaching any red lines.”(comments reported in RAND)

And there is ample room for things to get much uglier. Despite eight deaths during the violence, it is worth noting that most police forces and the Basij militia refrained from using lethal force during the Ashura protests, sometimes at their own personal demise. The police and the Basij were mostly armed with batons and tear gas, and youtube videos have shown them often being overwhelmed, cornered and beaten themselves (see "Uskowi on Iran" for an image and video analysis of the Ashura clashes).

Wednesday, amidst pro-government rallies numbering in the hundreds of thousands, there were signs that the regime is ready to escalate its response. In what seems to have been a conscious effort by the regime to send a stronger message, the leader of the legislative, the speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, said that the protesters violated civil rights, and called for the “arrest of offenders of the religion and the harshest punishment for antirevolutionary figures.” (NY Times) Others said that the protesters were now considered "enemy of God".

On a note of optimism, one possible scenario for a quieter revolution comes from the fact that even within the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard, the factional divide between realists and ideologues is present. It is reported that in 1997, around 77% voted for Khatami. But this was a different time and about a popular vote. The opacity of the "New Right" is such that it is difficult to tell if there are any cracks within their resolve.

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

Iran's nuclear aspirations, Turkey's take on it, and what 2010 has in store






Iran abandoned an agreement negotiated in October seeing them send nuclear material for enrichment in Russia and in France just as fast as it adopted it. While negotiations along the same lines may be revived, the recent pickup in internal unrest has put those on hold.

Israel had put a deadline of December '09 for negotiations with Iran while they have given assurances behind closed doors that they are not yet committed to a military strike. The renewed and intensification of negotiations - with a tilt towards stronger sanctions is likely to resume soon with pressure coming from the US as they have announced at the end of December. In doing so, it will be important to understand the positions of possible detractors in the process such as China and Russia. Turkey is another one of those and considering their interests in the affair will have to take precedence over unilateral action vis-à-vis Iran.

Here's a focus on Turkey as it sees its neighbor, Iran.


Turkey, like China, have large commercial interests in Iran and are not ready to jeopardize that. On top of that, Turkey shares a long border with Tehran which happens to be kurdish territory. Turkey launched a series of raids inside Iraq a few years ago to attack kurdish villages and they consider the PKK a terrorist organization. Erdogan mentioned that Turkey has a treaty with Iran regulating their relationship going back to 1636! They will thus support a strong Iranian government no matter who's in power. Erdogan has called Ahmenidejad (sp?) his "friend" in the past; he clearly doesn't want to estrange his neighbour.

Turkey also feels like it's been treated unfairly over the past 50 years in its petition to integrate the EU. Today, it seems to have grown out of that phase. It is enjoying economic prosperity despite of it and is now looking around the world for partners and allies in a more even fashion. Luckily for Turkey, the world is now becoming more multi polar and they can more easily choose who to dance with. Look for it to regain a more influential role in the Middle East in the years and decades to come. Thus, above all, Turkey wants to remain independent. They are likely to continue to refuse moving closer to the US or other NATO countries on Iran nuclear issue or other similar agendas just like they did in 2003 when they were asked to play a greater role in the Iraq invasion. They are not about to align the faith of their country with what they see as american or israeli interests as they witness the turmoil it has created in a country that has gone down that route, Pakistan.

So while China and Russia have shown some leniency to the US on the Iran issue if we go by the latest Security Council resolution, Turkey might be a tougher sell. Turkey wants more diplomatic efforts to be done which they believe haven't been exhausted yet.

What is the relevance of Turkey? It is a secular country by constitution, it is the only working democracy in the muslim world, it is very prosperous especially by middle eastern standards, it is a NATO country and aspires to become an EU member. This is a natural ally for the US in the region, one that isn't tainted by oil resources, or hasn't been forced through conflict to become an ally. While the main issue for the US must be ultimately to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, attitudes of countries such as Turkey must be considered. This is something that the Obama administration does infinitely better than the last one. They must continue to do so, and cherish and nurture deep and wide diplomatic ties with as many countries as they can.

So what's going to happen with the nuclear issue in Iran in the first few months of 2010?

El Baradei, the now retiring IAEA head, has said for his departing words that we were "at the end of the road" with Iran. But short of an Israeli or American aerial strike in 2010, I think the new direction will be tougher sanctions - if that. Some sanctions that are being discussed could be crippling from the Iranian economy and many people will want to try that first. This is what the international community will settle for unless conditions change drasticially. While Israel is the only country facing a survival issue in this whole affair, they would be foolish to act militarily on their own. This is especially true considering the enduring political turmoil within Iran as I write this which is one of the major condition that could change very rapidly in the months to come. A revolution within Iran could render the nuclear issue moot, so why spend more political capital now if the indications are Iran is still a good way away from a bomb?

The last thing I'd like to add is about Iran's intentions for nuclear energy.

When you are faced with an enemy, the natural, instinctual thing to do is to assume that that enemy is in the business of deploying all of its energy solely to do you harm, particularly in the most evil, vicious way. The problem is that those assumptions are not only always different from the truth, but they enhance themselves in a vicious circle because your enemy will entertain the same rationale (Indeed, the tragic all-out-war, downward maelstrom of militaristic schedules and attack contingencies that was WW1 was in fact a direct consequence of this rationale considering the rather limited, regional original event that started it). The fact is the "death to america" rhetoric that we often hear coming from Iranian Friday preachers or officials is mostly targeted at domestic audiences, and is fringe in nature. At best - or at worst? they are the Glenn Becks of Iran. Neither the iranian military nor the clerical council (whichever you believe to be the real authority within Iran at the moment) would have on top of its to-do list on day one of acquiring a functional bomb to drop it on Israel.

Iran and other similar countries who want, or wanted the bomb in the past, do so for two reasons. First, the bomb is seen as a symbol of power and prestige. It would transform its relationships with neighbors, add more weight to their negotiating capabilities internationally, and enhance the national sentiment at home. Second, and this one is less obvious, Iran and many other countries, still feel the weight of the post colonial historical legacy. They have the need - no the urge, to break away from it. They feel that the anti-nuclear pressure exerted against them is patronising. Ask any people on the street of those countries why they want the bomb and chances are they will tell you: "You have it, why not us?"