Quetta Shura

Balochistan is another example of the unintended consequences an external military force can have on the legitimacy of a region’s political institutions. A well intended effort can quickly spread instability and alienate potential allies. Instead of quickly fixing a problem, it can take longer if the goal does not carefully match the means.

Balochistan is a large province in the south-west bordering both Iran and Afghanistan. Quetta is the southern tip of “Pashtunistan” and the presumed refuge of Mullah Omar the leader of the Afghani Taliban. He is part of the Quetta Shura, a collegiate group from which radiates Taliban and jihadist command and control and influence. The Shura is one of 3 main Taliban political center in Pakistan.Osama bin Laden could also be holed up in Quetta or the Pashtun part in the north of the province.

Historically Balochistan - much like the Tribal Areas to the north-east - has benefited from a large degree of autonomy due to its tribal background. The Balochs are a people who came from Iran 900 years ago. Balochistan was also the battle ground of a proxy war between the British and the Russians in the 19th century in the “Great Game” for resources and access to the sea in the Hindu Kush. The location of Afghanistan and Pakistan can again become the center of more international attention as China and India are looking west.

In any case, the autonomy and the future of Balochistan is currently in danger. The Baloch Assembly increasingly sees its power compromised by the greater penetration of the central government in its affairs. Some internal opinion believes there is potential for a civil war. The arm of the central government are the Frontier Corps (FC) in Balochistan, a central paramilitary organization responsible for maintaining security in the border areas for Balochistan but also for the Tribal Areas.

These incursions have come to a point where an analyst of Balochistan talks of a “parallel government” ran by the cent pak gov through the FC.

The pressure in Balochistan is likely to mount as the United States seek ways to engage the Quetta Shura. Despite being the location of Mullah Omar, the United has been unable to target Balochistan militarily like it has done in other sanctuary areas directly or through the Pakistanis. 

The central government has led successful military offensives in both the Swat Valley and South Waziristan in 2009. In those areas, the Pakistanis saw vital threats to their own power and is the reason why they acted at great costs of their own. Historically, these offensives only took place after a treaty between the Tribal Areas and the central government collapsed amidst the turmoil left by the demise of President Pervez Musharaff.

The Pakistanis have recently said they would suspend any renewed offensives for a year. So that leaves North Waziristan and Balochistan untouched. Yet, North Waziristan is under heavy aerial drone campaign. Balochistan is different and no direct action by any side appears possible.

So what parties have to look for is the FC. But a better alternative would be the Baloch provincial institutions of government.

Many Balochistan people see the FC as a self serving entity, more concerned about increasing their power at the expense of the indigenous (democratic) institutions. They are seen as enriching themselves by controlling the lucrative smuggling activities while neglecting their duty. Officially, it’s protecting the Baloch people, denying access to the border to the “bad” people and seeking out anti government - and anti-afghan forces - within the province.

Since they do not serve their primary purpose the U.S. command is denied an important sanctum in Pashtunistan. And yet the FC continues to receive substantial portions of the U.S. aid sent to the Pakistani military.

The behavior of the FC is somewhat similar to the roles independent commanders - large and small warlords - play on the other side of the border in the lawless, anarchic parts of the country. While the afghan equivalents come from a weak central government, the Baloch case exhibits a predatory and corrosive effect on already existing institutions. The tip in the balance comes from resources – arms, money, and external support – that is being given to the FC but not to the Balochistan natural authorities.

The other forces in the region also destabilizing Baluchistan is, of course, the Taliban and other similarly minded groups. This is where things get so complicated because support for the Taliban comes from different sources. The FC is sometimes unconcerned with the Taliban and can also be quietly supportive. Similarly, within the province of Balochistan, there are those who reject the Taliban and wish to conserve and augment democratic and western liberal values, and those who have a soft spot in their heart for Muslim militancy and traditional values.

But even the democratic faction in Balochistan - who should favor efforts to defeat the most subservient religious extremists in their midst – disapproves the presence of the FC. This is because of the FC’s conflict of interest, their corrosive effect on Balochistan’s political institutions, and, also an invasion of privacy and human rights.

In America, there are debates over how much government should encroach upon civil liberties in the name of greater security. Similarly, the people of Balochistan demand at what cost can the FC go after religious extremists and impose draconian measures such as sealing the borders, clamping down on protests, intrusively investigating the public and carrying kinetic actions in the midst of the population.

The growing instability of Balochistan can be another lesson for American endeavors in Afghanistan: governance must be served through the bottom up instead of top down. Whatever your intentions, external forces wielding military might entering a region will necessarily corrode indigenous political institutions - making the external force illegitimate. The external forces will also inevitably slowly shift its purpose becoming less inclined to battle fringe extremist insurgents and more inclined to self-serving privateering or otherwise get involved in running the area.

Throughout history, for any given political system where there is a center dominating the periphery, the relative power of the center vis-à-vis the periphery will fluctuate over time for various reasons. Sometimes, the “barons” are stronger and sometimes the “king” is. Clearly, given the socio-economic nature of the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the relatively weak means or intent the Pakistani center or the Americans in Afghanistan have to bring about change, the tip of power must lie with the barons. An invading power bent on establishing full central control must be ready to do things neither the Pakistani nor the Americans are ready to do. Historically, such measures have included things like purging the local intelligentsia, establishing colonies or otherwise being ready to stay for the long run.

As a consequence, the money and support that went to the FC should have gone to the government of Balochistan. If it had been the case that Balochistan authorities were supporting actively enemies of the Pakistani government or US government, efforts should have been made to support indigenous factions to dethrone the authorities. Instead, bypassing local institutions is only likely to alienate the whole population of Balochistan -including your natural allies - and creates multiple levels of instability within the political community and the structure of power instead of simply targeting the authorities.