We are hearing that there are still disagreements about the implementation and interpretation of the Obama plan for Afghanistan. The differences seem to pit the Pentagon against the civilian executive. The American generals wish for a more expensive, fuller counter insurgency strategy while the civilians insist on a narrower engagement. The Obama administration is eager to find a way out and is ready to tolerate a certain level of violence within Afghanistan as long as true counter-terrorist action is carried out effectively. The Pentagon, on the other hand, is reluctant to give up a strategy that seems to have worked so well for them in Iraq.
There lies the problem. I believe that the ongoing resolution of the conflict in Iraq has much less to do with American military involvement through a Surge of troops and a re-writing - however praise-worthy it was, of the Counter-Insurgency manual by General Petraeus, than it had to do with changing conditions in the indigenous conflict between the Sunnis and the Shias.
In Iraq, an active civil war was going on. The Sunnis had lost their traditional position of dominance in the country and were fighting for their future against a vindicative and revived Shia majority. Partly because of Saddam's past policies of integrating the country by settling Sunnis in traditional Shia or Kurdish territory, there was now a central area in Iraq that became the hotbed of inter-sectarian violence centered in and around the capital Baghdad. On top of the century old sectarian rivalry, Iraq had rich oil reserves that acted as a strong centralizing force.
The turning point came late in 2006 - before the Surge was even announced, when the Sunnis collectively figured they could not win. They were in desperate need for an ally and that ally came in the form of the US occupier. At the same time, the US forces changed their approach and instead of fighting them like they did in 2004 and 2005 in Fallujah or Ramadi, engaged the Sunni population at the village and tribal level creating more human contacts and offering local leaders money and development support in exchange for their help in turning the irreconcilables within their midst. Not only that, but the Americans also offered political protection against their Shia adversaries vis-à-vis the creation and composition of the national government. The US successfully came in between both parties and the political process of forming a government and the reconstitution of the country could move forward. The Surge itself provided the additional security needed to cement the tacit truce, particularly in Bagdad which was the focal point of the sectarian violence, but it could not and was not the primary factor in the consumption of the inter-sectarian conflict.
The Shias were also exhausted on their side and so the parallel political process at the national level could move forward. The opportunity was seized, the security gains cemented but only because an equilibrium had been reached in the intestine conflict. In many ways, the "violent dialogue" of the inter-sectarian conflict was a necessary step.
Since then, the violence has dropped both in between Shias and Sunnis and against American forces although there continues to be few but spectacular attacks every other month perpetrated by the Sunni irreconcilables. December was the first month in the war without a single American casualty, and the inter-ethnic violence continues to go down on a year by year basis in a conflict that has made over 100,000 Iraqi casualties by most estimates - only a fraction of which came from direct American action. The next step for Iraq is the parliamentary election now slated for March. How successful they are will dictate whether the country continues down the path of peace or if tensions reappear between the factions.
The situation in Afghanistan is largely different and this is why the American cannot hope to successfully fight a counter-insurgency without going beyond their national tolerance, surtaxing their treasury and perpetuating a legacy that is weakening their international standing. They should not do it on the principle of balancing responsibilities and national interests. And they cannot expect the same success from a new Surge because they fail to see the fundamental differences between the two conflicts, and overestimate their role in the improvement of the situation in Iraq.
In Afghanistan the war is not between two indigenous factions, but between the anti-afghan forces and the US government. The Taliban and other groups loosely associated with them are fighting the Americans first hoping that one day they will get at the central government and its northern allies. The civil war between the old afghan adversaries is frozen and the "violent dialogue" will not resume until the Americans rescind their front role. The Karzai government is not only shielded by the presence of the US government (see "Afghanis fighting for Afghanistan") but also by its geography. In Iraq, both warring factions were intermingled in the infamous sunni triangle. Not so in Afghanistan where the Pashtuns are located primarily in the South and East and have sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan effectively forming a Taliban mini state. There is no violence in Kabul like there was in Baghdad. There is neither a centrifugal pull exerted in Afghanistan by the equivalent of Iraqi oil. The conflict is currently more religious, more about freedom and less pragmatic. The Sunni tribal leaders and power brokers were interested in keeping a stake in their country and eventually joined the central government. The anti-afghan forces are true mujahedeens and currently see no reason to engage the central government. Neither are the Karzai governement and its northern allies ready to extend a hand to their foes since they have little incentive to do so.
Of course, there are different paths for conflicts to resolve themselves and certainly not all should look like Iraq. But basing a strategy on "what worked in Iraq" and applying it to fundamentally different conditions on the ground makes for a very dubious outcome. At the core is a discrepancy between national interests - that of the Americans and that of the Afghan government, and their security responsibilities. There needs to be an intellectual separation made between the afghan conflict which is the affair of the afghan factions to resolve, and the counter-terrorism and support role - not front role, in the afghan conflict which is the affair of the Americans.
My next piece will be about the prospects of the Afghan National Forces and the historical mistake of the Americans to play a front role in the Afghan conflict after Tora Bora and the disarmament of the Northern Alliance.
The turning point came late in 2006 - before the Surge was even announced, when the Sunnis collectively figured they could not win. They were in desperate need for an ally and that ally came in the form of the US occupier. At the same time, the US forces changed their approach and instead of fighting them like they did in 2004 and 2005 in Fallujah or Ramadi, engaged the Sunni population at the village and tribal level creating more human contacts and offering local leaders money and development support in exchange for their help in turning the irreconcilables within their midst. Not only that, but the Americans also offered political protection against their Shia adversaries vis-à-vis the creation and composition of the national government. The US successfully came in between both parties and the political process of forming a government and the reconstitution of the country could move forward. The Surge itself provided the additional security needed to cement the tacit truce, particularly in Bagdad which was the focal point of the sectarian violence, but it could not and was not the primary factor in the consumption of the inter-sectarian conflict.
The Shias were also exhausted on their side and so the parallel political process at the national level could move forward. The opportunity was seized, the security gains cemented but only because an equilibrium had been reached in the intestine conflict. In many ways, the "violent dialogue" of the inter-sectarian conflict was a necessary step.
Since then, the violence has dropped both in between Shias and Sunnis and against American forces although there continues to be few but spectacular attacks every other month perpetrated by the Sunni irreconcilables. December was the first month in the war without a single American casualty, and the inter-ethnic violence continues to go down on a year by year basis in a conflict that has made over 100,000 Iraqi casualties by most estimates - only a fraction of which came from direct American action. The next step for Iraq is the parliamentary election now slated for March. How successful they are will dictate whether the country continues down the path of peace or if tensions reappear between the factions.
The situation in Afghanistan is largely different and this is why the American cannot hope to successfully fight a counter-insurgency without going beyond their national tolerance, surtaxing their treasury and perpetuating a legacy that is weakening their international standing. They should not do it on the principle of balancing responsibilities and national interests. And they cannot expect the same success from a new Surge because they fail to see the fundamental differences between the two conflicts, and overestimate their role in the improvement of the situation in Iraq.
In Afghanistan the war is not between two indigenous factions, but between the anti-afghan forces and the US government. The Taliban and other groups loosely associated with them are fighting the Americans first hoping that one day they will get at the central government and its northern allies. The civil war between the old afghan adversaries is frozen and the "violent dialogue" will not resume until the Americans rescind their front role. The Karzai government is not only shielded by the presence of the US government (see "Afghanis fighting for Afghanistan") but also by its geography. In Iraq, both warring factions were intermingled in the infamous sunni triangle. Not so in Afghanistan where the Pashtuns are located primarily in the South and East and have sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan effectively forming a Taliban mini state. There is no violence in Kabul like there was in Baghdad. There is neither a centrifugal pull exerted in Afghanistan by the equivalent of Iraqi oil. The conflict is currently more religious, more about freedom and less pragmatic. The Sunni tribal leaders and power brokers were interested in keeping a stake in their country and eventually joined the central government. The anti-afghan forces are true mujahedeens and currently see no reason to engage the central government. Neither are the Karzai governement and its northern allies ready to extend a hand to their foes since they have little incentive to do so.
Of course, there are different paths for conflicts to resolve themselves and certainly not all should look like Iraq. But basing a strategy on "what worked in Iraq" and applying it to fundamentally different conditions on the ground makes for a very dubious outcome. At the core is a discrepancy between national interests - that of the Americans and that of the Afghan government, and their security responsibilities. There needs to be an intellectual separation made between the afghan conflict which is the affair of the afghan factions to resolve, and the counter-terrorism and support role - not front role, in the afghan conflict which is the affair of the Americans.
My next piece will be about the prospects of the Afghan National Forces and the historical mistake of the Americans to play a front role in the Afghan conflict after Tora Bora and the disarmament of the Northern Alliance.
Photo credit: CFR.org
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